On the 24 th of October 2012 the Republic of Ireland switched off its analogue spectrum marking a crucial juncture in its transition to a fully digital television 
Introduction
This article will trace the development of the digital transition in Ireland, from its inception in 1997 to analogue switch off in 2012. In policy terms the transition to digital television can be characterised as a significant moment in the shift from government directed media policy to media governance. Media governance has been defined as 'formal and informal, national and supranational, centralised and dispersed mechanisms that aim to organise media systems' (Iosifidis 2011) . The increased significance of EU competency in its member states' media and communications policy is one aspect of the transition to media governance. It can also be argued that in the digital transition, competition, the market and market governance became key coordinates in EU media governance, reflecting the EU's own competitive digital agenda (Michalis 2007) . This is the wider framework for the EU's policy development in this area.
The article will detail and evaluate Irish state's policy performance in the digital transition, in the much-changed context of digital media governance. It will evaluate the state's success in achieving a range of policy goals through the consideration of three distinctive phases in policymaking towards digital television across multiple agencies of policymaking. Centrally it will outline how the interaction of Ireland's competition oriented policy dynamics, corporate strategising and the European Union's competitive media governance effected the achievement of some policy goals but not others.
Ireland's Media System and the Political Economy of the State
In the literature on media systems, Ireland is often grouped with the UK and the US as a liberal media system (Hallin and Mancini 2004) . However, this describes only one aspect of the characteristics of the Irish media system without reference to its place within wider international dynamics. Ireland's media system is shaped by, amongst other factors, the small size of the state, its open economy, its insertion into the supranational governance of the EU and the competitive contexts that emerge from its overlap with the UK's media system. The Irish state is shaped by the nature of its insertion into the global political economy. Often labelled the most globalised nation in the 2000s, its economic boom/bubble (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) was partially predicated on openness to the international economy and adjustments to liberalisation, re-regulation and privatisation overseen by a succession of centre-right coalitions. One categorisation of the Irish state is that of the competition state. A competition state is defined as a state that prioritises 'economic competitiveness over social cohesion and welfare' (Kirby 2009 ). As a competitive state Ireland's political economy is oriented to attracting foreign direct investment of which a key policy mechanism is low corporation tax and light touch regulation. Complementing foreign direct investment (FDI) are varied policies that co-ordinate indigenous enterprises that piggyback on the infrastructure and revenues created by inward investment (O'Rian 2004) . However critics have also detailed the social consequences of Ireland's political economy. The low tax regime and the dependence on FDI has consequences for the capacity and autonomy of the state which at times has proven under-resourced and vulnerable to interest group influence (Adshead 2008) . In relation to media governance, policy and politics mediate the structural emphases of the competition state but indigenous policy makers, interest groups and institutions compete within this powerful, overarching economic framework.
Governance and Digital Television Policy Goals
The framework for digital television diffusion was developed at European level under the auspices of digital television policy and the wider policy approach to media convergence. Core to the European policy approach is the concept of platform competition and regulatory neutrality in platform diffusion (European Commission 2002) . The key dynamics of market driven investment and regulated competition of satellite, terrestrial and cable platforms entail a central role for the European Commission's competition directorate. However the Commission's policy towards state aid in relation to platform development and the part played by public service broadcasters as a policy instruments for DTV development has been a slowly evolving one. The Commission accepts that public broadcasters can play a role in DTV development but only on the basis that their activities do not distort competition amongst DTV platforms (satellite, cable and terrestrial). States, through their public broadcasters, can intervene in the development of digital television platform development on the basis of either market failure or common interest objectives (Schoser and Santamato 2006 The inclusion of DTT in the mix of platforms was predicated on achieving specific policy aims, many of which were aligned to national television policy. The policy goals associated with DTT (as in other countries which adapted the platform) can be summarised as:
• Freeing up analogue television spectrum for new communication services (socio economic goals)
• Ensuring that citizens still have access to non pay television services regardless of their location or wealth (universal service and universal access goals)
• To offer competition to cable and satellite multichannel platforms so that plurality exists in the digital television supply market (market competition goals/plurality goals)
• To allow for the continuation of a nationally regulated free to air television ecology (television policy goals)
• To support the cultural centrality of public service broadcasting in national broadcasting policy and public purposes more generally in communications policy (public service goals) DTT thus had the capacity to meet many public interest criteria associated with media and communications policy making. Primarily, DTT would enable continuity for the analogue broadcasting ecology in Ireland. It would act as a bridging technology wherein the cultural space of Irish television would be sustained and regulated according to democratic rationale. It would potentially sustain diversity and plurality in the emerging digital media environment.
Digital Television Policy Development 1997-2003
Ireland's pre-digital television structure was characterised by the availability of four free to air terrestrial channels in 1.4 million households. RTE, funded by combined license fee and advertising/commercial revenue, operated two television channels RTE 1 and RTE 2. TG4, an Irish language channel, was introduced in 1996 and was funded by a direct subsidy from government, commercial revenues and a subsidy in kind from RTE. The commercial national channel, TV3 was provided for by legislation in 1988 but only found financial support to launch in 1998. In addition to the terrestrial channels most of the population also received the four main UK terrestrial channels (BBC1, BBC2, ITV and Channel 4) off-air or through cable. It is estimated that 33% of households along the eastern seaboard and along the border with Northern Ireland could receive the UK terrestrial channels off-air.
Approximately 50% of the population received the UK channels through cable or MMDS (a line of sight analogue multichannel distribution system) services. In the pre-digital environment multichannel television was widely diffused and it was UK terrestrial channels (both off-air and subscription) that provided a second tier of viewing for Irish households.
In 1997 the UK satellite operator BSkyB, 36% owned by News International, had switched to digital multichannel delivery and had strategically decided to market and sell its services, direct to home, in Ireland. The cable industry, stimulated by European and national telecommunications policy was consolidating and was over the coming years, to see a number of smaller operators bought out so that only two players of significance were left in the market: NTL, owned by a North American telecommunications company of the same name, and Chorus, owned jointly by Independent News and Media and Liberty Media (a subsidiary of AT&T). By as early as 2000 BSkyB's satellite service SKY had amassed 220,000 customers benefitting from the demand from rural dwellers beyond the reach of the mainly urban cable providers. If DTT was to be successful it would have to be developed and deployed with haste.
A project management group (PMG) was set up to develop the regulatory, financial and technological model for DTT. It, consisted of civil servants from the broadcasting department and the department of finance, consultancy groups (with financial, technical and legal expertise), and RTE. The model proposed by RTE and adopted by the PMG entailed giving RTE a 40% shareholding (on the basis of it selling it's network) in an integrated multiplex and distribution company named Digico. The other 60% would go to interested private partners with experience in wireless distribution markets. Within the PMG, however, objections arose over RTE's asset share in the spectrum resource. The financial advisers, AIB Capital Markets, sought to reassess RTE's role in Digico. External to the group, the newly licensed commercial broadcaster TV3 posited that RTE's benefitting from the spectrum resource could be construed as state aid. The telecommunications regulator the ODTR, also from outside the group, objected to RTE gaining a shareholding in a terrestrial spectrum asset, arguing it should be auctioned in the market like other spectrum assets. The legal advisors within the project management group, NERA, advised that RTE's benefitting from the Digico resource could be justified under European state aid rules.
AIB eventually advised that, to avoid potential state aid issues, RTE should have no share in Digico. RTE rejected these arguments suspecting a conflict of interest on the part of AIB Capital Markets (it was also advising a potential customer for the network, Crown Castle) and resisted its exclusion from the management of the DTT platform (Corcoran, 2004) . At a political level, the then Minister, Sile DeValera was under considerable lobbying pressure from TV3. Backed by its parent company CanWest, it had already brought a complaint of state aid against RTE to the European Commission and threatened to do so again if RTE was seen to benefit from Digico (Murphy, 2004) . TV3 was also successful in mobilising a number of the Minister's own party backbenchers to challenge RTE's role in Digico in the Dail (parliament).
Under these circumstances the Minister decided not to support RTE's role in Digico and the Digico model was dropped.
A second model was developed and legislated for in the 2001 Broadcasting Act wherein government enabled RTE to sell its transmission network and legislated for the auctioning of a commercial multiplex license as a single entity. The public free to air services would be available on a free to air multiplex. The economic climate had changed, however, and in the context of the stock market crash in technology companies, interest in developing a commercial multiplex had evaporated. One bidder for the multiplex option, IT's TV, had put forward a service offering which included the provision of mobile broadband and telephony based on an evolving European project for wireless internet access (WINDS/WIRELESS). The bidder, however, lost financial backing when the parameters for non-televisual services were reduced in the licence offering. Again, the telecommunications regulator objected to this as a potential incursion into the evolving 3G market. With no interest in the multiplex operation license the initial momentum behind DTT had now faltered.
Digital Television Policy 2003-2006
By 2003, in a market of 1.4 million households both cable and satellite platforms were steadily developing. Both NTL and Chorus continued upgrading their networks and NTL now had 365,000 subscribers, with Chorus at 240,000. The UK licensed satellite broadcaster SKY had 280,000 subscribers and was driving uptake through advanced television technology and its access to high value film and sport content (Corcoran, 2004) . The cable companies had both announced a triple play strategy, with the intention to offer telephony and internet access alongside their television channel packages. This entailed significant infrastructure upgrade and each depended upon multichannel television subscriptions to finance and drive those upgrade plans.
For the telecommunications regulator this was an important element of its strategy in developing competition in fixed line telephony and broadband markets. Corporation, which, itself, held majority shares in BSkyB (Flynn, 2011) . Ultimately, Liberty Global would twice benefit from the absence of a competitive free to air Ireland and the Republic of Ireland) distribution of UK and Irish channels would be a strong public interest argument for the provision of the main public service channels both side of the border. Outlining its spending RTE pointed to the €222 million it allocated to indigenous television production for RTE 1 and RTE 2. With a license fee level of €125m, it depended significantly on the commercial success of its initiatives as a subvention to its public service output.
In 2007 UPC communicated its concerns over the emerging DTT strategy to the Communications Department. A key issue was 'the possibility that the multiplex or multiplexes operated by RTE (and consequentially, the digital terrestrial transmission network) having been established with state funding, will be used to provide multichannel television services' (Mc Cann Fitzgerald 2007) . UPC stated that for both itself and SKY, the UK terrestrial channel were a significant driver for the diffusion of its services. It laid out its case:
Entry by RTE into the multichannel TV market using the multiplex or multiplexes allocated to it on the terms set out in the bill and in reliance on a terrestrial transmission network upgraded with State resources would not only be unfair but would also severely distort competition. If it occurred it could place at was considered to be more suited to HDTV, which would be a potential driver of DTT. UPC in a consultation on new services reminded the Department 'UPC's complaint is still with the European Commission. In the context it is only fair to say that as long as RTE benefits from state funding and ambiguities continue to exist in relation to the funding of either the proposed new services or the upgrade of the network, UPC will monitor developments for the roll out of Saorview' (DCENR, 2011a).
As part of its submission Boxer TV had committed to investing €168 into multiplex and service development and offering tiered channel offerings on the platform by Vision, but after contract negotiations lasting one year, they withdrew from the process also citing difficulties in concluding a contract with RTENL. Easy TV, were then offered the license but also declined. By summer 2010 it appeared that the terrestrial platform was to, once again, fail to launch.
The inability to conclude a contract with RTENL was cited by both BoxerTV and One Vision as a key reason for not taking up the multiplex licenses. RTENL had demanded an upfront bond of €20 million as insurance against either company pulling out of its contract following RTENL's upgrade investment. It pointed out the investment in the hybrid model carried risks for all parties. It had at that point spent €40 million on network upgrade and was planning on investing a further €30 million.
The BAI later announced that commercial DTT would only be viable if RTE was separated from its transmission business and the legislation changed to allow the BAI to intervene in contract negotiations (BAI, 2010) . This analysis, however, sidestepped the economic contexts that both companies had also cited as reasons for not pursuing with state aid threats hanging in the background, there was no possible way of sourcing the terrestrial channels from the UK. The viability of the hybrid free to air/pay model that was pursued was always high risk. In both the UK and Spain, the original hybrid DTT models had failed due to the saturation in pay tv markets. This led to the re-launch of those platforms as fully free to air options. Whereas there were other countries that had successfully launched a hybrid DTT platform they had done so early or in conditions when there were limited entrants into the pay TV market and new local content was included (e.g. Finland, Austria). In a saturated market like Ireland, the case for pay television on a terrestrial platform was always questionable.
Both cable and satellite offered pay television services and had already captured a considerable segment of Irish television households through bundled service deals (UPC triple play) or premium content (SKY). The pay TV services proposed by the DTT consortia did not significantly improve on the price or content offerings of SKY and UPC. In a market of 1.46 million television households where 73% were already pay-tv households the business argument was not compelling (Comreg, 2007) .
During the one-year hiatus wherein the BCI attempted to find a commercial multiplex provider, RTE had continued with its development of the free to air multiplex as it 
Policy goals and policy outcomes
In the transition to a digital television system in Ireland there was a complex trade off of policy goals that reinforce the analysis that Ireland's status as a competition state has significant consequences for socially oriented policy goals. There have been many successfully attained policy goals in the digital transition; the generation of competitive broadband infrastructure and services (UPC); competition in the Pay TV market (between UPC and SKY); the development of a base of free to air television services, universally accessible and free to air (Saorview); the release of analogue spectrum to be auctioned for mobile wireless services. However it is also worth reflecting upon the policy goals centring on DTT.
In the first instance DTT offered a subscription free service to the 13% of the population who were not UPC, Sky or BBC/Freesat customers. The DTT platform offers technological improvements in programme quality and reception but thus far has little to offer that will extend plurality and diversity of content. RTE has developed additional channels (RTE+1, RTE HD, RTE News 24, RTE Jr) but are essentially re-presenting content that was already available. The 2009 Broadcasting Act had legislated for the development of two more public service channels, an Irish Film channel and an Oireacthas (Parliament) channel. However, the global financial crisis had hit Ireland hard. Ireland's banking system had been rescued by a bank guarantee from the government turning private debt into public debt. On foot of this Ireland was obliged to take a loan from the ECB, the IMF and the European
Commission. The enforcement of austerity policies, requested by its lenders, ensured that the additional public service channels were put on hold. A successful DTT platform always hinged on the launch of a platform with culturally relevant content, and, given the small state constraints of Irish broadcasting, this was most likely to be achieved through sourcing UK content. This would help launch DTT with the prospects of attracting more indigenous channels as the platform diffused.
The frustration surrounding the development of a DTT option, on successive occasions, presents serious consequences for the audiovisual landscape in Ireland. It is arguable that the capacity for content development now rests with the ability to define the terms of distribution (through platforms and services) and the integration of service distribution with content production. Irish channels will be, for the most part, guests on the dominant distribution systems of SKY and UPC, driving subscriptions but ultimately funding their competitors. This has potential implications in relation to future costs of distribution and the changing terms of service. There is regulatory protection in relation to 'must carry' rules and significant market power regulations but there are limits to this protection.
An additional aspect of the trade off in policy goals relates to the costs of the transition that have been borne by RTE and the implications that has for digital public services. RTE's new services are cleverly low cost but add little in relation to new and innovative cultural and informational content. On the other hand RTE has invested €70 million in the terrestrial network upgrade and borne the costs of marketing and managing both the Saorview and Freesat platforms as well as developing new services to forward analogue switchover policy. These costs are ongoing and have consequences for the resources available for content production.
The attainment of a universal free to air service was in the final phase of DTV policy driven by the need to meet the European mandated ASO. Another key goal was the freeing up of the 'digital sweetspot' to auction spectrum to raise revenue for the state.
What is left of universal availability and access to services in Irish television policy?
In the competitive policy framework a two-tier television market has emerged wherein a 87% of households subscribe to cable and satellite services whilst, for 13% of the population, an underfunded and potentially marginal DTT technology is available. The 13% are characterised as being mainly rural, old and less well off.
According to a Behaviour and Attitudes survey of 2010 'there are significant socioeconomic skews amongst analogue households towards manual workers and state benefit recipient heads of household, and members of the farming community'
(Behaviours and Attitudes, 2010). In the period of switchover the government avoided drawing on legal state aid mechanisms to boost the terrestrial platform relying primarily on market investments that never came. So the subsidised set top boxes, interactive services, new institutional structures and research and development funding that has been used in other small states struggling to sustain a national platform were never called upon. The costs borne by RTE (ultimately funded by the license fee payer) stand in contrast to the gains to the exchequer in the recent auctioning of the spectrum freed up by ASO to be made available to 4G operators, i.e. Remaining within the stricture of European competition policy and unable to marshal legal state aids to deliver social and cultural goods, media governance in Ireland is increasingly characterised as market governance. The reliance on and attention to the needs of foreign direct investment entail policy goals that can be attained when they
